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Solid waste policy decisions are concentrated at the local government level. 
Nevertheless, state level governments have played a significant role in framing solid 
waste options at the local level. In the 1960s and 1970s the involvement of state (and 
federal) level(s) of government became seen as necessary based on the idea that the solid 
waste management problem was too difficult to be managed single-handedly by local 
governments because of excessive costs in collection, handling, and disposal of solid 
wastes (Luton, 1996). Since the 1980s, states have mandated recycling, established 
recycling goals and minimum requirements, adopted strategic plans, provided incentives 
to recycle and source reduction in the form of grant money, promoted more restrictive 
landfill requirements, and stimulated the creation and competition in markets for 
recyclables (Khator, 1993). All these decisions at the state level are important in 
influencing the solid waste policy choices dominant in each state. This provides the 
motivation for this empirical analysis which concentrates upon the determinants of state 
solid waste policy choices rather than a national level analysis. 
The supply of solid waste policies is decided by state executive and legislative 
decision-makers. This paper discusses the decision of state elected officials to direct local 
solid waste policies using a political economy approach where these decisions result from 
both the political benefits captured by them as suppliers (Feiock and Stream, 1998) and 
economic trade-offs between policies. With this approach I expect to shed some light on 
the reason why, during the 1990s, local solid waste policy evolved away from landfills 
towards environmentally friendlier alternatives. 
This project uses local level data aggregated at the state level and it is pooled across 
the fifty American states and time (1991-1999). The choice of time period is constrained 
by the lack of systematic data for solid waste management before the 1990s. Testing 
different aspects of state solid waste policy is made difficult by the lack of consistency in 
the available data. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the recycling goals legislated (or 
not) by the 50 states throughout the time period chosen.  
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Introduction and Historical Perspective1 
 
Solid waste management combines characteristics of regulatory and distributive 
policy and its relevance grew with the large increase in amounts of industrial and 
domestic waste generated by mass consumption society, especially after the 1950s. 
Historically, individuals and families have had primary responsibility in collecting and 
disposing of solid waste, which was essentially composed of organic materials that could 
be burned for fuel, used as crop fertilizer, or fed to livestock. To be more accurate, until 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the role of municipal governments in managing 
waste was virtually nonexistent.  
The state of affairs begins to change in the late nineteenth century, in large part due to 
the extraordinary population growth of American cities as a consequence of 
industrialization. Concomitantly, scientific knowledge at the time considered contagious 
diseases a consequence of gases emanating from dejects and urged massive efforts to 
clean American cities. When germ theory was developed in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, communities were already aware of the need for cleanliness and 
sanitation as a means of assuring public health. 
With the advent of germ theory, solid waste management stops being simply a matter 
of public health and becomes a technical and administrative issue. This provides the 
background for the development of an increased role of sanitary engineers under the 
argument that solid waste collection and disposal should be run by neutral experts, above 
the interference of local politics. Not incidentally, this is also the time of the Progressive 
reform movement. 
It was the hope of these sanitary engineers to help localities to find a “one best way” 
to manage waste. Even though there was an agreement upon avoiding, at all cost, 
dumping on open land or water, open burning, and using untreated wastes as landfill, it 
wasn’t clear which of the remaining alternatives – filling, burial, plowing, and 
incineration – was preferable and how they might be combined by each municipality. 
                                                 
1 This section borrows heavily from Luton (1996: 88-96). 
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Most of the reuse schemes attempted during the twentieth century failed due to their 
incapacity to be economically viable in comparison to sanitary landfill. And although the 
sanitary engineering departments were insulated from political interference, the contracts 
for solid waste collection and disposal were often attributed by personal and political 
favor. 
Dumping and landfilling became the dominant forms of managing solid waste, but 
the lack of clear criteria defining what a “sanitary landfill” should be allowed the 
prevalence of traditional land dumps as the primary method of disposal and created 
increasing environmental pollution problems. 
The solid waste crisis of the 1970s and 1980s is a consequence of the large increase in 
the amounts of per capita production of waste and of the change in the composition of the 
waste, with paper and plastic replacing horse manure and ashes as the most significant 
portions of municipal solid waste. 
 
(Table I about here) 
 
The problems resulting from solid waste became too large and complex to be dealt by 
municipal governments alone. It is by the mid-1960s that we begin to see intervention by 
the federal and state governments in a number of forms. A detailed analysis of the role of 
state governments is made in the next section. At this point I concentrate the analysis on 
the role of the federal government. 
The first piece of federal legislation dealing with solid waste was the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act of 1965, amended in 1970 by the Resource and Recovery Act (RRA). The 
major goal was to improve the methods of solid waste disposal by providing technical 
and financial assistance to stimulate alternatives to open burning and the legislation 
allowed the federal government to be involved in the research and development of new 
solid waste technologies (Luton, 1996; EPA, 1989). In 1976 another set of amendments 
was adopted under the name of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The 
1976 amendments prohibit new open dumps and close or upgrade existing ones and 
allowed local governments to contract with private corporations for resource recovery 
facilities (Luton, 1996).  
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In 1979 the EPA approved another set of guidelines for state solid waste management 
plans aiming at involving the public, reducing air and water pollution resulting from solid 
waste disposal, and promoting environmentally safe disposal of wastes. Solid waste 
facilities and practices should avoid interference with flood plains, contamination of 
groundwater, and disturbance of endangered species.  
The 1984 amendments to the RCRA made the technical standards for the operation of 
solid waste disposal facilities more stringent. Higher standards in the operation of 
landfills were set and states were encouraged to meet EPA’s expectations. 
Probably the most well-known set of guidelines of the Federal government to states is 
the one suggesting a hierarchy of approaches approved in September of 1988: waste 
reduction, recycling, incineration, and landfilling in decreasing order as environmentally 
preferred alternatives. This is consistent with the need for an integrated approach to the 
solid waste problem recognized by sanitary engineers in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Moreover, it confirms the need to identify the specific characteristics of the city, 
county, region, or state, the types and quantities of solid waste, and social, political, and 
organizational factors in order to manage waste accordingly (Luton, 1996). The 1988 
guidelines also set national goals of 25% waste reduction in waste generated, 25% 
recycling rate, and 20% of the remaining waste sent to waste-to-energy facilities by 
September 1992. 
Landfill standards revised in the beginning of the 1990s focused upon acceptable 
location, design of new and existing landfills, established closure and post-closure care 
standards, imposed the use of double liners of flexible materials, and mandated the use of 
leachate collection systems (Steuteville and Goldstein, 1993).  
The RCRA Subtitle D legislation operates in a regime of partial preemption, that is, it 
establishes minimum regulatory requirements that states should comply to. Federal 
interference in the development and implementation of state programs should only occur 









The theoretical framework employed to explain state solid waste policy is a political 
economy approach. In areas traditionally under the responsibility of local governments, 
state policy can be justified as a way of reducing economic and political transaction costs 
in search of both economic and political efficiency. This section begins by explaining 
state policy intervention as a means to correct local market failures and justifies policy 
instrument choice as a result of purely economic trade-offs. The second part argues that 
the choices of decision-makers are not framed within economic criteria alone. In fact, the 
choice between landfilling, incineration, recycling, and source reduction has both 
political and distributive consequences that, I shall argue, have an equal or even more 
relevant impact upon policymaking.  
 
Economic Transaction Costs 
  
The decision faced by state governments is one along a continuum between vertical 
integration and complete delegation of solid waste policy. The first solution is one of 
total centralization, with the state government responsible for writing and implementing 
solid waste policy without any input or discretion left to the localities. This alternative 
implies the existence of a single hierarchical structure at the state level but it is not 
reasonable since it becomes too centralized, costly, and inflexible to handle the thousands 
of decisions to be made. Coordination of the subunits representing the local governments 
in this hierarchy would be very complex and difficult to achieve. 
The second solution is complete delegation (nonintervention), emphasizing policy 
adoption at the local level, where the local governments are free to select the governance 
structure for each policy area that minimizes local transaction costs. If local governments 
make decisions concerning certain policy areas without federal or state level guidance 
they are operating in an economic free market of sorts. In this local market, transaction 
costs are present in several forms, usually under the general label of market failures. 
When this happens, policy intervention by the state would leave the jurisdiction as a 
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whole better off by adopting policies consistent with the preferences of the state median 
voter.  
Ultimately, the relationship between state and local governments fits within these two 
ideal types. The decision regarding the degree of centralization/decentralization is 
determined by the amount of economic and political transaction costs involved in the 
exchange. The problem is then to determine if and when should state legislators intervene 
in local policy choices. In a certain sense, this situation is not new. The option between 
Montesquieu’s confederate republic and Madison’s compound republic was a choice 
between having a decentralized alliance of city-states and having a centralized federal 
government. Ultimately, Madison’s idea prevailed albeit with an economic argument that 
city-states better serve the “local and particular” (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). 
The argument for state intervention can be justified in Coasian terms. Just like Coase 
(1937) proposed that certain market transactions involving large negotiation costs should 
be integrated under the hierarchy of the firm, it can be argued that, due to inefficiencies in 
local policy making and choice, state action is necessary to reduce transaction costs and 
achieve more efficient solutions. In the case of local market transactions, the costs of 
negotiation and market failure correction may be too high so that state command-and-
control or incentive based regulation is able to economize on these costs (Epstein and 
O’Halloran, 1999). However, state intervention also suffers from inefficiencies that result 
from the inability to establish/choose what is best for each individual community, 
excessive bureaucratization or implementation failures. The degree of intervention 
(contract features) becomes a matter of weighting the transaction costs experienced at the 
local level against the transaction costs experienced by the different hierarchical 
arrangements (contracts) between state and local governments. Moreover, the number of 
decisions concerning a specific policy can either be left to local governments (market) or 
can be centralized at the state level, when it has any extra-local impacts (hierarchy). 
Ultimately, decisions regarding urban growth, solid waste, economic development, or any 
other issues of interest to both state and local governments are to be made with this 
framework in mind. The fundamental questions are then why do states regulate local 
policy markets; and what is the contract between a state and its local governments that 
minimizes transaction costs? 
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In each state, legislators will choose the contract (legislation) that minimizes 
transaction costs, since they are not able to enter in individual agreements with each local 
government. As an example, one can easily argue that, certain policy issues cut across 
jurisdictions assuming a regional character and result in less than economic efficient 
allocations. When this occurs local policy choices/solutions may not be adopted due to 
collective action problems, generating a worse outcome for some jurisdictions in question 
and for the region as a whole and requiring state level regulation. Ideally, only local 
market inefficient transactions should be regulated to avoid the loss of local autonomy 
and choice and allow the capture of high-powered market incentives resulting from 
competition among local governments (Williamson, 1985; Frant, 1996). In practice, 
however, state legislators have political incentives to elaborate a contract that minimizes 
their political transaction costs and maximizes their chances of reelection.  
Next, the different types of political transaction costs are discussed from a theoretical 
perspective and the trade-offs between centralization of policymaking at the state level 
and delegation to local governments that determine the boundaries of the relationship 
between state and local governments highlighted. The governance structure adopted in 
each particular instance will be the most attractive from the point of view of the median 
state legislator according to the logic of political efficiency (Epstein and O’Halloran, 
1999). 
 
Political Transaction Costs 
 
In the preceding section, I argued that state legislators often regulate local policy 
markets in order to overcome inefficient transactions and allocations created by local 
government activity. However, it would be naïve to believe that state legislators are 
uniquely concerned with economic efficiency. In fact, state officials’ goals are far more 
vast than efficiency and encompass, among others, reelection and subjective equity goals. 
Hence, when contracting with local governments, state legislators will write a contract 
that maximizes their reelection chances motivated by the logic of political efficiency and 
minimization of political transaction costs.  
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In the exchange between state and local governments, five major types of costs are 
usually present: agency costs, legislative decision-making costs, uncertainty costs, 
commitment costs, and sunk costs. Each type will be defined and its implications for the 




States face agency problems because local governments are numerous and difficult to 
monitor in the implementation and enactment of state policy. Principal-agent 
relationships involve two major types of costs – adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Moe, 1984). First, principals face adverse selection costs because of the ex-ante 
information asymmetry present in the relationship between principals and agents. In their 
role of principals, state governments will elicit information from their agents (local 
governments), but only the agents have full knowledge of the information being required 
by the principals and can use this knowledge to their own advantage. Moreover, just like 
their state level counterparts, the local level officials behavior is shaped by the political 
business cycle and periodical elections. As argued previously, this might lead to less than 
efficient decisions, making state policy making an efficient intervention, at least 
potentially. 
Second, moral hazard results from ex-post opportunistic behavior on the part of 
agents. Local government officials may respect the letter of the law while attempting to 
escape legislators’ intentions. As in the case of adverse selection, shirking or non-
compliant behavior results from information asymmetry favoring the agents.  
State level mandates transmit information to local governments regarding the 
preferences of the state government enacting the legislation. In order to minimize the 
transaction costs incurred in the contract two types of mechanisms can be typically relied 
upon: external and/or internal controls. On one hand, to reduce the costs incurred by 
adverse selection and moral hazard, the principals (state governments) devise incentive 
structures and sanctions (external controls) that can prompt the agents (local 
governments) to perform according to the principals’ expectations, which in this case 
would mean to comply with the letter and intention of the approved state laws. On the 
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other hand, principals can also achieve the cooperation of the agents using internal 
controls such as trust, credible commitments, and cooperation between the two levels of 
government. Internal controls rely more on social and moral commitment and reputation, 
and opportunities for reduction of conflict. 
 
Legislative Opportunity costs 
 
The exchange between state and local governments involves distinct preferences. 
States may want to direct or limit local choices, whereas localities want discretion or, at 
least, state support (financial and/or technical) when implementing a contract. 
When enacting a piece of legislation, state legislators face legislative opportunity 
costs (Horn, 1995). A detailed contract involves more time and effort spent in carving the 
specific piece of legislation than contracts allowing for discretion of local level 
governments in its implementation.  
Several types of opportunity costs can be identified. Here we concentrate upon two of 
these: financial and time/agenda constraints. Financial opportunity costs derive from 
budget constraints and limitations. The fiscal capacity of state and local governments 
determine the range of policy alternatives that can be adopted and constrain the financial 
incentives that can be attributed in order to direct individual behavior. 
There are many issues that can be addressed by elected officials at a given point in 
time. Because officials face these pressures upon their time, their agenda reflects the 
choice of a set of issues to consider in detriment of others. In order to include a new 
issue, another has to be dropped. Not only the number of issues that can be addressed at 
one point in time is limited but also the longer legislators spend on a specific piece of 
legislation, the less time will be available to introduce other legislation (Horn, 1995). 
In terms of legislative costs (time, effort and money) I posit that a strict detailed 
mandate will be more costly to implement than a more vague piece of legislation. 
Moreover, when detailed contracts are approved, the implementation and the results at 
the local level will mirror more closely the preferences of the state legislature than if the 





When a contract is approved, it may be difficult for each local government within a 
state to determine how it will be affected by that piece of legislation. Contracts entail 
financial and technical consequences for local governments and may exacerbate conflicts 
between local groups with different preferences. The degree of support for a contract then 
depends upon a third set of political transaction costs – uncertainty costs (Horn, 1995). If 
local level preferences are aligned with the goals of state legislation, we can expect a high 
degree of support for the contract at the local level, independently of the contract features 
(Jenks, 1994). As a consequence, uncertainty costs affecting state legislators will be low. 
When local governments face fiscal pressures, lack the technical competence or face 
local opposition, contract implementation may entail large uncertainty costs for state 
legislators. With this in mind, the implementation of the contract is expected to vary 
according to state legislators’ preferences and individual local contexts. 
The approval of a piece of legislation by state legislatures does not guarantee its 
automatic implementation. In order to implement a contract several enforcement 
strategies can be adopted. Typically, authors identify three types of strategies: coercive 
(command-and-control), cooperative (incentive-based), and mixed strategies (Burby and 
Paterson, 1993; Jenks, 1994). The coalition enacting the mandate at the state level may 
rely on one or more of these strategies in order to minimize the uncertainty costs resulting 




Once the enacting coalition changes, there is no guarantee that the same enforcement 
strategy will be followed, with the same degree of stringency, or that the commitment to 
the contract will persist. This commitment problem affects local governments because it 
makes uncertain the flow of intergovernmental transfers in terms of financial and 
technical assistance. Hence, commitment costs will be smaller in local governments 
better equipped to deal with the mandate and higher in communities more dependent of 
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intergovernmental assistance because these communities demand more from state 
governments in order to respect the terms of the contract. 
When designing a contract state governments will attempt to minimize commitment 
costs by including provisions that safeguard future attempts to renege on the contract. 
From the perspective of the state legislator, commitment costs can be minimized by 
securing an agreement that creates a “stable structure of exchange” (North, 1990: 50) 
both over space and time. In this fashion, state legislators are able to control part of the 
commitment problem, even if, ultimately, commitment costs depend on local 
governments’ perception of state legislators’ actions.      
 
Sunk Costs and Path Dependency 
 
Finally, the approval of mandates by state legislators and their enforcement by state 
agencies also faces sunk costs arising due to path dependency. The idea of path 
dependency affecting local policy choices will be discussed further ahead but, for now, it 
is important to understand the state’s perspective. An example should illustrate this idea. 
The success in the enforcement of an unfunded mandate is largely dependent on early and 
current practices at the local level. If a state mandates a recycling goal of 25% to be 
achieved in 2 years by all localities within the state, communities already recycling at or 
close to that level are more likely to obey the mandate than communities with very low 
recycling rates. Although this seems to be an obvious statement, the implications are 
extremely important in terms of cost of compliance since local governments that made 
the “wrong” choice of relying heavily on landfilling and/or incineration will find it harder 
to comply than localities opting for recycling and source reduction early on. This 
example highlights the importance of making the “right” choice early on and points to the 




Given the existence of political transaction costs in the relationship between states 
and localities, why would states be interested in entrusting local governments with policy 
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activity? Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) argue that delegation helps states to reduce their 
workload, to take advantage of local agency expertise and proximity to the problems, and 
to avoid inefficiencies arising from over centralization usually known as influence costs 
such as delays, logrolling, and information inefficiencies (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). 
This section presented the political transaction costs that justify state action in policy 
areas previously under the exclusive responsibility of local governments. State legislators 
act so as to minimize political transaction costs and having political efficiency 
(reelection) as the ultimate goal. As the next section will confirm, political transaction 
costs can also be an opportunity for individual legislators and elected officials to further 
their political careers, interests, and ideology. 
 
Political Benefits and Ideological Costs 
 
The previous section depicted state policy adoption as a consequence of political 
transaction costs. This section explores some additional factors affecting the motivation 
of individual state legislators and discusses two sets of reasons linked with election 
cycles and ideological and personal preferences that help to explain why individual 
suppliers make the choices they make (Feiock and Stream, 1998). Even though these 
factors are not traditionally thought off as political transaction costs, they will be 
addressed as such. 
Policy decisions on the part of legislators or local officials entail, more often than not, 
political benefits and costs. Elected officials have high-powered incentives (reelection) to 
respond to specific constituencies operating at the local level. Based on this assumption 
one can expect that, ceteris paribus, officials will support policies that are supported by 
the median voter. 
Probably even more important than the general public, the role played by interest 
groups in the policy area in question is relevant for the choices made by elected officials. 
The degree of competition between interest groups and their influence and the selective 
benefits to be ripped will affect the power of each interest group and, in turn, affect the 
policy choices made by elected officials. It is worth noting that the importance of interest 
group activity in particular and public opinion in general will vary according to the 
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visibility of the policies being enacted and to the moment of the electoral cycle when the 
decision is made.  
Elected officials have short time horizons which make them overvalue current 
benefits and costs and dismiss or undervalue long-run benefits and costs. Hence, election 
proximity affects policy choice and adoption because officials involved may feel the need 
to adopt more popular policies in order to accomplish reelection goals. This is even more 
noticeable when the election is highly competitive. The argument here developed is one 
of the political business cycle applied to the state level of government. In election years, 
the role of political benefits becomes crucial with officials seeking the adoption of 
policies with visible, immediate, and directly traceable benefits, and with costs that can 
be deferred in to the future. In addition, when choosing between competing policy 
alternatives, elected officials weight the political benefits accruing from satisfying 
competing demands made by citizens and interest groups. 
When making policy decisions, elected officials are expected to behave consistently 
with their ideology and personnel preference. Everything else equal, it is expected that 
Democrats will support more spending and pro-active environmental policies than 
Republicans. 
In certain situations one can expect that elected officials experience ideological costs. 
This fact is more prevalent in election years. The desire of politicians to please the 
electorate by adopting what is perceived as “good” policy may force them to sacrifice 
some of their ideological convictions. Knowing what policies are favored or opposed by 
the median voter may help elected officials to enhance the probability of reelection and 
explains, at least partly, why, in certain occasions, elected officials vote against their 
ideological beliefs. 
 
The Theoretical Framework Applied to Solid Waste Management Policy 
 
The framework presented has the potential to be applied to several policy areas, 
including solid waste management, growth and land use management, economic 
development, among others. In this paper I develop a first test of part of the framework. 
To that intent, I take the legislated state recycling goals as the dependent variable in order 
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to determine how these goals are chosen and what factors influence the decision of state 
legislators to be more or less stringent. In future work, I expect to develop other tests 
related to other characteristics of state solid waste policies, namely the types of mandates 
and incentives. 
  
Solid Waste Management as a Production Technology Choice 
 
The economic explanation argues that the choice involves comparisons of benefits 
and costs of each of the alternative management technologies or policy instruments – 
landfilling, incineration, recycling, and waste reduction. These options are compared in 
terms of their marginal benefits, that is, how well they contribute to the disposal of 
wastes and to the minimization of negative externalities. The benefits are analyzed in 
relation to their unit costs. In other words, based upon economic reasoning alone, the 
waste management benefits of the median taxpayer are maximized by the available 
production technology which maximizes the benefits of waste disposal and minimizes the 
negative externalities at the least cost. Besides discussing solid waste management as a 
production technology choice, this section also reviews the relevant literature. 
Using this approach there are two types of benefits that can result from solid waste 
management tools (production technologies) – disposal of wastes and mitigation of 
negative externalities. The first type of benefits can be seen as constant across production 
technologies, meaning that landfilling, incineration, recycling and source reduction are 
equally effective in dealing with the problem of disposal. The choice between production 
technologies is based upon the minimization of producer-to-consumer negative 
externalities. This is the second type of benefits that have to be especially considered. 
Health risks, contamination risks, and reduction of property values are some of the 
negative valued impacts that affect the community that did not fully consent to them 
(Weimer and Vining, 1992). 
The capacity of local landfills affects the choice of production technology. Peretz 
(1990) argued that communities facing lack of landfill capacity face pressures to look for 
alternatives to solve the solid waste management problem. The availability of suitable 
land for future landfilling also influences the choice of production technology. Overall, 
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low landfill capacity will tend to increase negative externalities. Furthermore, the health 
and contamination safeguards involved in each choice will also affect the presence of 
negative externalities. 
The costs involved in the management of solid waste also vary across production 
technologies. Hence, the choice between alternatives depends largely upon the 
comparison of costs of different production technologies.  
The costs of recycling depend upon the participation levels, economies of scale, and 
external markets for recyclables. First, increases in participation levels reduce the unit 
cost of recycling due to economies of scale. As the costs of recycling decrease, a 
substitution effect occurs, with the governments replacing landfilling or incineration with 
more and larger recycling programs (Fisher, 1996). Furthermore, state level funding may 
affect the pattern of solid waste management choice because it makes municipalities 
better-off – income effect – simultaneously altering individual behavior. 
A similar mechanism is thought to occur when the population of a jurisdiction 
increases. The size of the population has been analyzed under the rationale that, as the 
population increases, the amount and diversity of recyclable materials also increases 
creating the need for solid waste programs larger in scope. Again, according to our waste 
management explanation, the costs of recycling programs will go down as the population 
gets larger, which allows for recycling programs larger in scope (Paehlke, 1993). In their 
1993 study, Feiock and West also found population to be a positively significant 
predictor of the adoption of municipal solid waste recycling programs, both in the 
need/responsive model and in the final model.  
Additionally, the existence and degree of development of external markets for 
recyclables affects the cost of recycling. Paehlke (1993) argues that economic growth is 
not incompatible with recycling as long as there is a market for recyclables. The stability, 
certainty, and equilibrium of this market are decisive to achieve an integrated waste 
management. McClain (1995) discusses the some of the problems most frequently 
reported with a market for recyclables. On the supply side, the author argues that 
producers are reluctant to invest in manufacturing technologies that employ recyclables 
due to the uncertainty in the supply of materials. On the demand side, communities 
hesitate in investing in the collection of materials because of the volatility of prices and 
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revenues. As a result, McClain argues, a vicious cycle is in place and it is only broken if 
strong incentives are provided to both sides of the market. Accordingly, while landfill 
capacity is adequate and costs of landfilling kept low, recycling programs will either not 
be enacted or present small scope.  
The costs of landfilling depend upon the availability and capacity of landfills and the 
cost of regulation. Negative externalities are very often addressed through command-and-
control regulation such as liners for landfills. More stringent landfill regulation increases 
the costs of landfilling comparatively to recycling (McClain, 1995). 
In jurisdictions where there is a shortage of landfill capacity, the costs and negative 
externalities associated with landfilling are high, leading to increases in the scope of 
recycling programs. Additionally, state government level mandates, intergovernmental 
financial assistance, and general tax revenue to finance the recycling programs alter the 
benefit/cost ratio of recycling relative to other alternatives. These may constitute the 
incentives that help to break the vicious cycle described by McClain (1995). 
State level mandates, especially if associated with grants, are likely to reduce the 
relative cost of recycling when compared to other available alternatives and, for this 
reason, encourage broader recycling programs. Feiock and West (1993) found that state 
level mandates and intergovernmental financial assistance are significant predictors of the 
adoption of residential curbside programs. If reduction goals are included in state 
legislation, municipalities have an incentive to make the programs as large in scope as 
possible. Adopting curbside pick-up will help municipalities to achieve those mandated 
goals because, ceteris paribus, the increased convenience will augment citizen 
participation. 
Several researchers have tried to establish the consequences of adopting unit based 
pricing programs to reduce waste generation, either using case study approaches and 
quasi-experimental designs (Callan and Thomas, 1997; Nestor and Podolsky, 1998; 
Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996; Van Houtven and Morris, 1999) or national level data 
(Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1998; Jenkins et. al. 2000). The fourth solution to solid waste 
management – waste reduction – has proven difficult to implement on a large scale due to 
technological limitations and the radical behavioral change required (Peretz, 1990), 
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nonetheless the number of source reduction programs has been growing nation-wide and 
47 states are currently involved in this type of activity (EPA, 1998). 
When flat-fees are adopted in solid waste management, households do not have an 
incentive to economize on waste generation and disposal, since the marginal price for 
each additional pound/container of garbage is zero. Because households maximize their 
utility subject to a budget, unit pricing programs that place non-zero marginal price on 
waste disposal lead to reductions in waste generated and increases in recycling (Jenkins 
et. al. 2000). However, these two positive consequences, one direct and the other indirect, 
are challenged by arguments of illegal disposal (burning or dumping) to avoid paying the 
marginal price (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996). Either way, the adoption of unit based 
pricing assumes that waste generators acknowledge the relative costs of disposal each 
option entails and rationally choose the least cost option (Callan and Thomas, 1997). 
Jenkins et. al. (2000) found that, as an incentive to recycle, unit pricing is ineffective. 
According to the authors there are two possible reasons. First, the average price of 
disposal in the sample is too low to generate a change in behavior of relatively high-
income households. Second, a direct impact on waste disposal might be occurring. These 
findings are supported by previous research (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996) that also 
concluded that unit pricing does not influence either recycling rates or participation rates. 
Other research contradicts the findings of Jenkins et. al. (2000). Callan and Thomas 
(1997) found that communities implementing a unit pricing system will have, on average, 
higher annual recycling rates. This effect is even stronger if the community also offers 
curbside recycling services. By imposing unit pricing and providing curbside recycling, 
communities are able to lower the relative costs of recycling (time and storage costs), 
thereby making recycling more attractive for individuals (Callan and Thomas, 1997; 
Jenkins et. al., 2000). 
The impact of different unit-pricing program features on curbside recycling rates was 
addressed by Nestor and Podolsky (1998) in their case study of the City of Marietta, 
Georgia. The authors concluded that, for this particular case, a bag program increases 
recycling rates more than a subscription can program. This study was extended by Van 
Houtven and Morris (1999) who did not find systematic differences between the two 
programs in the same city. However, the authors concluded that the bag program caused 
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larger reductions in waste setouts (mixed and total waste) than the subscription can 
program. The authors concluded that the bag program produces savings for residents and 
social welfare increases. In general, this conclusion may not hold however, if we consider 
that, on one hand, it is based on a single case study and, on the other hand, the marginal 
cost of additional waste generated per month by a household depends upon the particular 
amount increased and the point at which this increase occurs. As a consequence, the 
program that maximizes household/individual welfare may vary depending upon the 
price structure of the two programs.   
Similarly, incineration involves costs and negative externalities that are pondered 
when deciding the production technology to be employed. In general, we expect that as 
the costs of recycling decrease relative to incineration costs, the larger in scope the 
municipal recycling programs will be. In accordance, Everett (1989) shows with the New 
Jersey case that, lower costs of other available options can also contribute to smaller 
programs. On the other hand, the enactment of air pollution controls on incinerators is 
likely to increase the cost of adoption of this production technology and, by that, decrease 
the relative cost of other solid waste management options. 
 
Variables and Indicators 
 
Because landfilling and incineration are considered the policy alternatives entailing 
the higher costs in terms of negative externalities, it is expected that, as reliance in 
landfilling and incineration decreases, recycling and source reduction will become the 
preferred alternatives. Measures for the number of landfills, incinerators, and curbside 
recycling programs were obtained from the national survey conducted yearly by the 
Biocycle periodical for the period between 1990 and 19992. Additional data was retrieved 
from the Green Index (1991). 
Population density is expected to have a positive effect upon recycling goals since 
higher densities produce economies of scale making it less expensive to adopt curbside 
recycling programs to fulfill the goals established by states. States with higher densities 
are also expected to legislate higher recycling goals because increases in population also 
                                                 
2 All Biocycle numbers are cited in the reference section. 
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increase the quantity and diversity of recyclable materials. Population density is 
measured in individuals per square mile and was obtained from the U.S Bureau of 
Census. 
The amount of solid waste per capita in tons produced in each state in a given year is 
also included as a measure of need, since the commitment to recycling is likely to be 
larger in states with larger amount of solid waste generated per capita due to space and 
environmental constraints3. 
  
Solid Waste Policy Tools as Consumption Goods 
 
The complementary explanation argues that the economic explanation fails to include 
political and environmental forces that affect the choice being made in each state (Peretz, 
1990). According to this explanation, citizens, environmental interests, and federal and 
state government officials have preferences concerning the available alternatives, valuing 
them as consumption goods. The political transaction cost framework examines the 
choice among the distinct production technologies as a function of both economic and 
political costs and benefits. 
The support for a specific policy instrument results from the willingness of legislators 
to supply it. Each individual legislator’s political support supply function is determined 
by his/her ideological preferences, the proximity of elections, and the political transaction 
costs involved in supporting a specific policy instrument. The aggregate supply function 
is determined by the sum of each individual legislator’s supply function measuring the 
degree of support for a policy instrument at a specific cost (Keohane, Revesz, and 
Stavins, 1998). In explaining a state’s preference for a specific policy instrument I 
consider the interaction of the individual suppliers characteristics and the political 
transaction costs they face. 
Citizens, environmental interest groups and entrepreneurs can affect the type and 
scope of the policy instruments adopted. Rather than a management alternative for 
implementing solid waste collection and disposal, each policy tool may be seen as a 
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consumption good directly valued by these actors in the community. This is because 
some residents have an ideological preference for a specific tool independent of the 
environmental effects of the programs for local waste problems. 
 
Policy Instrument Choice and Political Benefits 
 
State elected officials are utility maximizing individuals aiming at reelection and 
adopt policies consistent with this goal (Downs, 1957). Elections are for elected officials 
what profit is for private businesses – high-powered incentives (Williamson, 1985; Frant, 
1996). From this point of view, source reduction and recycling policies are obviously 
attractive, because they represent what citizens perceive as “good public policy” (Feiock 
and Stream, 1998). 
During the last three decades, we have witnessed organized environmental groups 
voicing their concerns about an “environmental crisis”. In particular, the question of solid 
waste management seems to deserve special attention. If policy is a response to 
environmental need, we should expect to see greater reliance on prevention strategies in 
states where solid waste management constitutes a serious problem. Also, states relying 
more intensely upon landfilling and incineration facilities (waste-to-energy plants) 
probably do so because of lower costs (tipping fees) of these alternatives when compared 
to recycling or unit pricing programs. As a consequence, state legislators would feel less 
pressure to change emphasis in solid waste policy instruments. 
In general, demand for recycling is expected to be high when cost savings can be 
realized, when it is consistent with community environmental values, and when it confers 
benefits to organized interest groups. 
Citizens and environmentalists interested in solutions to solid waste management 
problems value recycling and unit-pricing programs more than alternative actions such as 
landfilling or incineration (West et al., 1992). Environmentalists perceive the sitting of 
new facilities as inherently bad regardless of the availability of land or the amount of 
risks involved (Cassidy and Luger, 1998). 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Extremely high correlation between density and solid waste per square mile of territory and, 
consequently, strong multicollinearity did not allow us to include this variable as a measure of need. Solid 
waste per capita ends up being a good measure of need.  
 21
If the goals of the recycling programs are purely political, one can also expect to see 
the presence and influence of environmental support in a given municipality associated 
with recycling programs larger in scope (Feiock and West, 1993). Using county data, 
Mrozek (1990) concluded that pro-environmental voting was a statistically significant 
variable in predicting curbside pick-up adoption. Membership in an environmental group 
is also positively associated with the performance of recycling programs (Feiock and 
West, 1996). 
Source reduction and recycling programs are an attractive solution because citizens 
and environmentalists interested in solutions to solid waste management problems value 
these prevention strategies more than landfilling or incineration. This is because these 
alternatives can present potential environmental and health risks (West et al., 1992). 
Finally, it appears to be clear that, as Everett (1989) demonstrated for the New Jersey 
case, the lower the costs of other available options, the less a state will rely on recycling. 
The inverse is also true. As an example, the 1991 EPA regulations on landfills combined 
with rising land prices contributed to triple the average tipping fee of landfills in 6 years 
(Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996; Steuteville and Goldstein, 1993). Under these 
circumstances it is reasonable to expect changes in the preferred policy instrument(s) for 
solid waste management, and tests for these trade-offs will be developed. 
The size and the amount spent by each organized environmental group are 
particularly relevant because the costs of lobbying activities can be spread among 
members making collective action feasible. This is consistent with Olson’s (1965) 
argument that for organized interest groups, the marginal costs incurred in lobbying are 
outweighed by the benefits received by special interests. In this narrower view, recycling 
policies possess distributive characteristics. For this reason, we also expect that other 
groups oppose recycling expansion due to the selective costs these groups have to bear. 
Landfill and waste-to-energy plant owners and operators are likely to oppose recycling 
policies that endanger the expansion of their businesses. 
States with more active environmental groups/associations are more likely to adopt 
pro-active recycling legislation. State membership data on the National Wildlife 
Federation is used to develop a measure of the number of members per thousand 
inhabitants of state population that belongs to an environmental interest group. 
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With several interest groups supporting or opposing alternatives/tools of solid waste 
management, one can expect that elected officials will respond in a fashion that 
maximizes their chances of reelection. This argument is equally true when we consider 
the make up of the community adopting the policy. Accordingly, socio-economic factors 
such as income, education, and citizen ideology are expected to influence the state 
legislators choices in a significant way. Next, I review previous work regarding the role 
of these factors.  
 
Socio-Economic Factors Affecting Supply 
 
As established before, it is important to consider the role of contextual factors in the 
decisions of elected officials in providing a certain mix of policy instruments in 
managing solid waste. In this subsection I address state contextual factors such as wealth, 
education, and political ideology that are expected to influence the decisions of solid 
waste policy by elected officials. 
The impact of wealth upon solid waste management has been reported on several 
studies (Feiock and West, 1993; Feiock and Stream, 1998). Wealthier communities seem 
to display larger concern for the environment by demanding more recycling and source 
reduction programs. The rationale for this positive association seems to be the fact that 
communities with well-off citizens are more willing and committed to try new programs 
and are also more concerned with their quality of life. Moreover, from a tax capacity 
perspective, states will have slack resources to engage in more innovative programs, so 
that they can express more actively their concern with the environment, even if that 
brings additional costs in terms of time and money. 
Feiock and West (1993) tested competing explanations for the adoption of municipal 
solid waste recycling programs and concluded that income was positively related with 
adoption, not only in the economic model, but also in the final model combining all the 
significant variables of the seven competing explanations. Feiock and West (1992) and 
Kalan and Feiock (1998) also found income as a significant predictor of recycling 
program performance.  
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The importance of the education variable has been highlighted in the literature as a 
measure of environmental support (Feiock and Stream, 1998). More generally, education 
is relevant not only because it reflects the communities’ commitment towards 
environmental issues, but also because it translates the populations’ understanding of the 
trade-offs entailed by alternative policy instruments. In other words, educated individuals 
will be more aware of the importance of the strategies to reduce and reuse and will 
recognize the environmental costs incurred by not doing so. Mrozek (1996) found that 
college education was a significant predictor of municipalities’ early decisions to adopt a 
curbside pick up recycling program.  
Berger (1997) analyzed data from 43,000 households in Canada and concluded that 
education and income are both positively associated with recycling usage and access to 
recycling services. Additionally the author found that living in an apartment was 
negatively related to both usage and access to recycling services. 
Finally, states with more conservative citizens are less likely to support the 
commitment towards recycling both because they tend to be more reluctant to accept the 
increased public spending entailed by curbside recycling programs (Wiseman, 1992; 
Hood, 1995) and because they exhibit less pro-active environmental concerns. 
The individual state legislator will favor preventive solid waste policies in 
communities where the median voter is wealthier, more educated, and more liberal 
because this will increase his/her chances of reelection.    
The income measure is taken from the State Personal Income (1958-96) CD-
ROM made available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1997). The data for 1997 is taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States in its Internet version. The educational attainment variable is measured by the 
percentage of state population with high school diploma or above. This variable was 
obtained from the Current Population Surveys of the U.S. Bureau of Census. 
Citizen ideology is used as a measure of liberalism to test the hypothesis that a state’s 
tendency to adopt more active recycling policies increases as we move from states with 
more conservative citizens to states with more liberal population. I take the “updated 
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1960-1997 citizen ideology series” for the American states constructed by Berry et al. 
(1998) to test this hypothesis4. 
 
Election Benefits and Ideological Costs 
 
The proximity of elections leads incumbent legislators to press for the adoption of 
more popular policies that can yield them reelection. Hence, we expect the commitment 
to recycling and source reduction to increase in election years. 
Borrowing the argument from Keohane, Revesz and Stavins (1998) and Feiock and 
Stream (1998), I contend that the support that elected officials give to recycling 
legislation is a function of the effort necessary to provide that support, the effect of this 
activity in the chances of reelection, and the tradeoff between the level of utility derived 
and the ideological costs of supporting any given alternative. Not all politicians 
experience this tradeoff to the same degree. Liberals would experience the tradeoff to a 
lesser degree because the action that is most popular with the public is also congruent 
with their ideology. For conservatives, however, the adoption of recycling policies to 
please the public entails the cost of voting against their ideology. This argument suggests 
an interaction between electoral proximity and ideology, meaning that electoral proximity 
has a stronger effect on conservatives than on liberals. The hypothesized relationship 
between the variables, government ideology, election year, and commitment to recycling 







                                                 
4 Linear extrapolation is used for the years of 1998 and 1999. 
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 Figure 1 
         








Conservative    Ideology   Liberal 
 
Democrats have predisposition to adopt more pro-active environmental policies than 
Republicans, because they are more sensitive to environmental concerns. Conservatives 
are also traditionally more averse to spending than liberals (Khator, 1993). For both 
reasons, if curbside recycling programs are more costly than other waste management 
options (Wiseman, 1992), conservatives will favor them less. To test this hypothesis, a 
measure of government ideology is used. Considering that liberals are more 
environmentally concerned and more prone to spend, we can also argue that, for 
conservatives, it is more difficult to support recycling policies because of the “ideological 
price” they have to pay.  
Nevertheless, political parties will tend to favor an option that is politically popular. 
The election proximity may trigger the adoption of pro-recycling policies even if the 
government is conservative. For this reason, I hypothesize an interaction between 
government ideology and election proximity. 
State government ideology is measured by the “updated 1960-1996 government 
ideology series” given by Berry et al. (1998) based on the partisan division of state 
legislatures, the party of the governor and the ideology of state congressional delegations. 
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The data for 1997, 1998 and 1999 was obtained through linear extrapolation of the trend 
1960-1996. 
The election proximity variable is based on the information collected from several 
editions of the Book of the States published by the Council of State Governments. 
Electoral proximity is measured by a dichotomous variable, which takes the value of one 
for an election year (state legislature or governor) and zero otherwise. 
In election years, conservative governments are expected to approve more pro-
recycling policies than they would otherwise. To capture this, an interaction term 
between government ideology and election proximity is used. If the coefficient of this 
variable is positive, our hypothesis is confirmed. However, a negative coefficient is also 
possible. In that case the impact of elections is stronger among liberals, which confirms 
that conservatives are not willing to pay the ideological price of supporting policies 
against the preferences of their constituencies.     
A divided government will result in the approval of less pro-active recycling policies 
because compromises have to be established between the two branches of the state 
government hindering the frequency and amount of pro-recycling legislation passed. The 
variable takes the value of one for a state in a given year with a divided government, 
minus-1 for a unified government, and zero for split control. A divided government is 
present when the two chambers of the state legislature belong to one party and the 
governor belongs to the other. Split control means that one chamber of the legislature and 
the governor belong to the same party, while the other chamber has a majority of the 
opposite party. A negative coefficient is expected. In addition, a dichotomous variable 
was created to distinguish between unified Democrat control (=1) and unified Republican 
control or other combination (=0). A positive coefficient is expected. 
 
Legislative Opportunity Costs 
  
The discussion, vote, and adoption of state solid waste legislation entail opportunity 
costs for legislatures. As a consequence, I argue that the degree of professionalism of 
these governing bodies affects the decision to address recycling options. 
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More professional legislatures will have the resources required to address more policy 
areas and issues. For this reason, I expect that legislation favoring recycling will increase 
as the professionalism of the state legislature increases5. Legislative opportunity costs are 
measured by a time invariant indicator of professionalization levels of state legislatures 
proposed by Squire (1992). The index takes certain U.S. Congress characteristics such as 
member pay, staff members per legislator, and total days in session and compares these 
attributes to the ones exhibited by the 50 state legislatures. 
In addition to time and agenda constraints, opportunity costs also include financial 
burdens. As Khator (1993) hypothesized, states with financial difficulties are less likely 
to devote attention to recycling. The reason for this is simple: states in better fiscal 
condition have slack resources to pursue more innovative and expensive policies to 
manage their solid waste stream.  
State solid waste expenditures indicate not only the willingness of state legislators to 
devote resources to this policy, but also their ability to do so. Accordingly states with 
higher solid waste expenditures per capita are foregoing other uses of the same financial 
resources and expanding the number of choices within this policy area. Consequently, 
more state solid waste spending will allow the establishment of higher recycling goals. 
State solid waste expenditures per capita are collected by the Bureau of Census of the 




When adopting legislation establishing recycling goals, state legislators wish to 
reduce uncertainty costs, that is, once enacted, they expect that the goals will be pursued 
by local governments. The way the state legislators minimize uncertainty costs is by 
adopting higher goals in states where localities are already strongly committed to 
recycling.  
In order to measure local commitment to recycling I employ the proportion of 
communities in a state with curbside recycling programs. A positive relationship between 
                                                 
5 In the absence of more appropriate data, legislative professionalism is used as a surrogate measure of the 
amount of state legislation produced, assuming high correlation between the two variables. 
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the proportion of local governments with curbside recycling and the recycling goals 




In directing local solid waste policy choices, state legislators will be more successful 
with local governments in better financial shape. These communities will find it easier to 
cope with goals and mandates imposed by a higher level of government. State legislators 
can have an a priori rational expectation that they will be able to impose higher recycling 
goals in states where local governments spend more on solid waste policy. 
Local government expenditures in solid waste are available on-line at the Bureau of 
Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Additional data was retrieved from the 
1992 edition of the Census of Governments (1992).  
 
Sunk Costs and Path Dependency 
 
As argued previously state recycling goals are more likely to be obeyed if the local 
governments are already recycling at high rates. Because state legislators expect to reap 
benefits from successful pieces of legislation, they will choose higher recycling rates only 
if they can be achieved. In other words, higher recycling goals will be adopted in states 
with higher percentages of recycling and where curbside programs are already in 
existence. 
The unavailability of local recycling rates forces us to use the state recycling rate 
lagged one year as a proxy. In addition, the proportion of communities with curbside 
recycling programs in the previous year to recycling goal adoption will also be used as an 




The data used to estimate the empirical model is pooled across the fifty American 
states and time (1991-1999). The choice of time period is constrained by the lack of 
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systematic data for solid waste management before the 1990s. Testing different aspects of 
state solid waste policy is made difficult by the lack of consistency in the available data. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the recycling goals legislated (or not) by the 50 
states throughout the time period chosen. 
The model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE). A homogenous first-order autoregressive process is assumed to 
be common to all panels and to represent the pattern of serial correlation of errors 
operating within panels. This assumption follows the advice of Beck and Katz (1996) that 
a common autoregressive parameter, ρ, leads to superior estimates of β even if the data is 
generated with diverse, unit specific ρi. The small number of time periods (9) would not 
produce consistent estimates of the panel specific ρi and hence it was avoided. The data 
are transformed to produce serially independent errors and the Prais-Winsten 
transformation is employed. This procedure allows for the use of the first observation in 
each panel when estimating OLS with PCSE, avoiding the loss of observation due to the 
differencing procedure (Gujarati, 1995). The OLS parameter estimates resulting from the 
estimation with PCSE are consistent and the estimation process deals with panel-level 
heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Corrections for panel (spatial) 
autocorrelation were introduced. The election proximity variable was dropped due to 
extremely high multicollinearity with the interaction term.  
 
(Table II about here) 
 
While Table II summarizes the variables and the expected sign of the coefficients, 
Table III reports the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Most of the 
variables have straightforward interpretation. For example, the average number of 
landfills in the period considered across the fifty states is 72 with a standard deviation of 
102 landfills, ranging from a minimum of 1 (Connecticut 1999) to a maximum of 750 
(Texas in 1991). Similar interpretations can be made for other variables directly relevant 
for the analysis such as the percentage of solid waste recycled, the proportion of 
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communities in a state with curbside programs, the number of incinerators, or the amount 
of solid waste produced per capita in tons. 
 
(Table III about here) 
 
Table IV presents the results of the OLS with PCSE estimation using the state 
recycling goal as the dependent variable6. The overall model performs well, accounting 
for 30 percent of the total variance of the dependent variable (R^2 = 0.30). The Wald chi-
square test easily achieves significance at the 99 percent confidence level. 
 
(Table IV about here) 
 
The specific coefficients obtained have a large and interesting number of implications 
that should be addressed in detail. I proceed by focusing sequentially upon economic 
tradeoffs between solid waste policy instruments, socio-economic effects, and political 
transaction costs. 
The analysis of the individual coefficients reveals that the landfill variable is 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. States with a hundred more landfills have, 
on average, less 1-percentage point of recycling goal, when the remaining variables are 
held constant. The incineration variable indicates that no trade-off exists between 
recycling and incineration, which confirms previous findings (Tavares, 2000). The unit-
based pricing programs are positively correlated with recycling goals, but the effect is not 
statistically significant. 
The impact of environmental interest groups appears to be positive and strong. An 
increase in the NWF group of one member per one thousand state inhabitants increases 
the state recycling goal by 0.8-percentage points. This confirms the expectation that state 
legislators are responsive to environmental interest groups.   
One of the most remarkable results of the model is the substantial impact of 
population density in the recycling goals. An increase in a hundred individuals per square 
mile (the population density measure) in a given state increases, on average, 0.5 
                                                 
6 The recycling goal is legislated as the percentage of the total solid waste generated. 
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percentage points the recycling goal adopted by the state. Simply, this means that states 
with greater population density are more likely to establish higher recycling goals. 
According to the expectations, solid waste per capita is also positive, albeit non 
significant. If the two measures are thought to portrait economies of scale, we can 
conclude that the results are fairly consistent with prior expectations.  
The socio-economic measures have contradictory effects. The variable measuring 
personal income is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level and in the 
expected direction. A state where the income per capita is a thousand dollars higher has, 
on average, 0.6 percentage-points higher recycling goals. However, education seems to 
have an effect against expectations and previous work (Mrozek, 1996; Berger, 1997; 
Feiock and Stream, 1998). Not only the effect on recycling goals is negative but 
statistically significant. A substantive plausible reason for this might be the recognition 
by more educated citizens of higher administrative costs entailed by recycling activities 
such as curbside recycling. This, however, remains to be confirmed. The citizen ideology 
measure is positive but not statistically significant.  
Government ideology is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level and 
its coefficient has a positive sign, just like predicted. An increase of 10 points in the index 
of government ideology (increased liberalism) increases a state’s recycling goal by 0.5 
percentage points. The coefficient of the interaction term between government ideology 
and election proximity measures the ideological costs of adopting higher recycling goals 
in election years. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 95% confidence level 
indicating that conservatives are not willing to pay the ideological cost of voting against 
their ideological beliefs. More importantly, the results concerning government ideology 
and the interaction term are consistent with the idea that conservatives are, in general, 
less prone to support recycling, independently of factors such as election proximity. 
The results regarding political transaction costs also have interesting implications. 
Although legislative opportunity costs and tradeoffs are not confirmed, the model 
provides plenty evidence of rational expectations by legislators when adopting recycling 
legislation. Uncertainty costs are minimized by legislators adopting higher recycling 
goals in states where local governments are already committed to recycling. The variable 
curbside recycling lagged one year confirms this expectation. Hence, legislators are able 
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to claim credit for the adoption of recycling goals independently of how ambitious these 
goals are. 
The past matters. States where local governments are already committed to recycling 
and where the recycling rates are high are also more likely to have higher recycling goals 
established by law. An alternative specification of the same model confirmed the 
opposite effect of landfilling rates: states with higher landfill rates are also less likely to 
legislate high recycling goals. 
One last variable included in the model as a control – bottle bill law – is also 
statistically significant. In the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, ten states 
adopted bottle bill laws.  The model shows that states with bottle bill laws are more likely 
to have higher recycling goals. In fact the goals are likely to be higher, on average, by 9-
percentage points. In the last section, we present the conclusions of this research and 




The 1990s were characterized by a trend of diminishing number of landfills for space 
constraints and environmental reasons. Increasingly, states have relied more in recycling 
as an alternative policy instrument to deal with the increasing solid waste stream. The 
empirical analysis allowed us to confirm that recycling has been coupled with 
incineration and unit-based pricing programs to provide an alternative to landfilling. 
Furthermore, states characterized by wealthier and more liberal citizens and governments 
have higher recycling goals, which is consistent with previous findings.  
The findings regarding the impact of education indicate that the costs of 
environmentally friendly alternatives such as administrative costs of curbside programs 
and opportunity costs of the recycling activity itself might affect negatively the decision 
to adopt higher recycling goals. 
This project also confirms the impact of policy preferences, uncertainty costs and 
path dependence in the adoption of state legislation favoring recycling. The analysis of 
the results seems to confirm the obvious, indicating that suppliers are able to control the 
policy content to their own political advantage.  In fact, it is clear that the number of 
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municipal curbside-recycling programs in existence and the overall recycling rate in a 
state are important determinants of the state recycling goals. 
The results are also consistent, at least in part, with the theoretical framework 
presented. On one hand, the economic explanation is confirmed by the findings regarding 
the influence of the number of landfills and population density. The first variable 
confirms the economic trade-off in terms of alternative policy instruments while the 
effect of population density confirms the argument regarding economies of scale in 
recycling. 
On the other hand, the empirical findings regarding income, environmental interest 
groups, citizen liberalism, government ideology and its interaction with elections confirm 
the idea that socio-political variables also play an important role in explaining state 
legislators’ commitment to recycling goals. 
Future research should address other state level options regarding recycling such as 
recycling mandates and provision of incentives. Data for this research is not available at 
the moment, but the relevance of the analysis justifies more intensive commitment to this 














 Table I - Trends in Municipal Solid Waste Generation (1960-1990) 
Year Waste per capita 




1960 2.7 179,979   
1970 3.3 203,984 36.3 2.5 
1980 3.7 227,255 36.1 5.2 






Variable Measurement and Predicted Coefficients 
 
Variable Description Predicted 
coefficient 
Landfilling  Number of landfills (Biocycle) - 
Incineration Number of incinerators (Biocycle) - 
Unit Based Pricing Number of UBP programs (EPA) + 
Density Population per square mile + 
Solid waste amount Tons per capita (Biocycle) + 
Income Personal income per capita + 
Education % of state population with high school or above + 
Citizen ideology Berry et al. (1998) + 
Environmental interest groups NWF membership per thousands + 
Government ideology Berry et al. (1998) + 
Legislative professionalism Squire (1992) (time invariant) + 
Divided government Dummy variable (1=Divided 0=Split –1=Unified) - 
Unified government Dummy variable (1=Democrat 0=Republican) + 
Interaction  Government ideology * Election proximity +/- 
State Solid Waste Expenditures (t-1) State solid waste expenditures per capita + 
Local Solid Waste Expenditures (t-1) Local solid waste expenditures per capita + 
Curbside recycling (t-1) Proportion of communities in a state + 
Recycling Rate (t-1) State recycling rate (Biocycle) + 

























Landfilling  451 72.39 102.08 1 750 
Incineration 451 2.96 3.738 0 17 
Unit Based Pricing 451 63.088 208 0 1843 
Density 451 277.31 792.24 .971 5668.9 
Solid waste amount 451 1.145 .34 .4249 2.654 
Income 450 23424.31 3649.55 15528 37452 
Education 451 82.27 67.1 67.1 92.8 
Citizen ideology 451 46.32 14.4 4.74 84.037 
Environmental interest groups 437 4.39 3.25 0 23.535 
Government ideology 451 47.28 27.26 0 98.47 
Legislative professionalism 450 .221 .143 .042 .659 
Divided government 442 -.127 .85 -1 1 
Unified government 442 .244 .43 0 1 
Interaction 451 20.93 29.48 0 97.24 
State Solid Waste Expenditures (t-1) 450 6.905 12.84 0 75.80 
Local Solid Waste Expenditures (t-1) 450 40.342 22.67 1.29 123.47 
Curbside recycling (t-1) 450 19.52 24.38 0 97.33 
Recycling Rate (t-1) 450 18.97 11.03 1 48 

























OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors  
(Dep. Var.: State Recycling Goal) 
 
Variable Slope Coefficient Panel Corrected Standard Errors t-ratio 
Number of Landfills -.103* .006 -1.648 
Number of Incinerators .172 .199 0.868 
Unit Based Pricing Programs .003 .004 0.690 
Population Density .005*** .001 4.720 
Solid Waste per capita .687 1.42 0.484 
Income 001* .000 1.680 
Education -.324* .177 -1.827 
Citizen Ideology .055 .056 0.984 
Environmental Interest Gr. .793*** .201 3.945 
Government Ideology .057* .032 1.752 
Legislative Professionalism -8.44 8.62 -0.980 
Divided Government -.415 .909 -0.456 
Unified Government -2.05 1.72 -1.194 
Interaction Term -.011ª .007 -1.635 
State SW Expenditures (t-1) -.114 .098 -1.163 
Local SW Expenditures (t-1) -.005 .039 -0.118 
Curbside Programs (t-1) .083*** .032 2.610 
Recycling Rate (t-1)  .187*** .054 3.455 
Bottle Bill 9.22*** 3.58 2.578 
Constant 28.52** 12.89 2.212 
ρ = .80 
R^2 = .30 
Wald Chi^2 = 802.05 
N = 427 
*** P < .01 
** P < .025 
* P < .05 
ª P < .06 
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